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Conventional arguments identify either the median justice or the opinion author as the most influential justices in shaping
the content of Supreme Court opinions. We develop a model of judicial decision making that suggests that opinions are
likely to reflect the views of the median justice in the majority coalition. This result derives from two features of judicial
decision making that have received little attention in previous models. The first is that in deciding a case, justices must
resolve a concrete dispute, and that they may have preferences over which party wins the specific case confronting them. The
second is that justices who are dissatisfied with an opinion are free to write concurrences (and dissents). We demonstrate
that both features undermine the bargaining power of the Court’s median and shift influence towards the coalition median.
An empirical analysis of concurrence behavior provides significant support for the model.
Decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court have greatpublic significance. Its opinions direct the deci-sions of lower courts, shape public policy, and
affect the behavior of private individuals. Because judicial
opinions matter, and because they emerge from deliber-
ations largely hidden from public view, it is not surpris-
ing that there has been great interest in understanding
whether some members of the Court are more influen-
tial in shaping opinions than others. Indeed, the suspi-
cion that particular justices—and their replacements—
are particularly important underpins a common distinc-
tion between “critical” appointments and those that are
less important (Ruckman 1993). In short, understanding
which justices are influential in shaping Supreme Court
opinions is a central puzzle not just in the study of the
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Court, but in understanding its impact on the broader
political system.
The scholarly literature—both inpolitical science and
in law—has, by and large, offered two answers. One high-
lights the importance of the Court’s center. According to
“median justice” theories, the median justice has sway
over the content of opinions because she is critical to
building a majority in support of a particular decision
(e.g., Epstein et al. 2005; Martin, Quinn, and Epstein
2005). In contrast, other scholars have pointed to the in-
fluence of opinion writers. These “opinion author” theo-
ries argue that authorship confers agenda-setting powers
that allow those who draft opinions to exercise consider-
able influence (Bonneau et al. 2007;Hammond,Bonneau,
and Sheehan 2005; Lax and Cameron 2007; Maltzman,
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Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 2000).1 In these models, the final
opinion reflects the preferences of the opinion author,
although it may be sensitive to the preferences of the me-
dian, depending upon the relative positions of the two
actors and, in some models, the position of the status
quo. In short, most theoretical literature focuses on the
influence of the median justice and the opinion author
and leads to the expectation that opinions reflect (a com-
bination) of their preferences.
In this article, we develop a model of decision mak-
ing on collegial courts that offers a different answer.2 The
critical implication of ourmodel is that opinions are likely
to reflect the views of the median justice in the majority
coalition.3 This result derives from two features of judi-
cial decision making that have received little attention in
previous models. The first is the fact that in deciding a
case, justicesmust first and foremost resolve a concrete dis-
pute. In addition to preferences over legal rules, justices
may have preferences over which party wins the case con-
fronting them.4 The second feature is that justices who are
dissatisfied with the opinion written in support of a deci-
sion are free to write concurrences (and dissents). Taking
account of both features is significant because it implies
that justices will be reluctant to “switch sides” between
the majority, which favors one disposition, and the mi-
nority, which favors another disposition.Moreover, given
the ability to write separate opinions, they have no need
to do so. In consequence, bargaining power shifts to the
median justice of the majority coalition.
We demonstrate this dynamic formally by making
the—potentially controversial—assumption that justices
care sufficiently about the disposition to be unwilling to
switch sides. Focusing on this boundary case allows us
to highlight the impact of preferences over dispositions
on bargaining power. Nevertheless, as we argue below,
and then demonstrate empirically, the logic we identify
is relevant for decision making on collegial courts more
generally as long as justices care somewhat about disposi-
tions, even if they are (ultimately) willing to switch sides.
This finding has profound implications for the content of
1Lax andCameron (2007) offer an innovative variation that focuses
on the nature of language and relies on variation in writing ability
to generate opinion writer influence.
2In focusing on the internal dynamics of judicial bargaining, we
leave aside external factors such as separation of powers (e.g., see
Clark 2011; Owens 2010; Segal 1997).
3Westerland (2003) also points to the potential influence of the
coalition median, but provides no explicit theoretical foundation
for this influence.
4The assumption that justices care about both the rule and disposi-
tion is novel; existing literature treats the disposition as secondary
to the rule.
SupremeCourt opinions because it suggests that opinions
are systematically less centrist than implied by traditional
approaches, in particular by median justice theories. The
rest of the article is organized as follows. In the next sec-
tion, we provide background to justify our approach. We
then present our model. The third section provides em-
pirical support for the central implications of our theory.
The final section concludes.
Dispositions, Rules, and Expressive
Preferences
To motivate our model, it is useful to sketch the differ-
ence between traditional approaches and our argument.
When justices decide cases, they perform two (related)
tasks. They dispose of the controversy before them by de-
termining which of the two contending parties wins. This
is the “disposition” of the case. Second, justices explain
why they arrived at a particular disposition. This is the
“rationale” of the opinion, which provides the “legal rule”
that governs future cases.5 Naturally, rules and disposi-
tions are related: a specific rule determines—for a given
set of facts—which of the two parties ought to win.6 Most
traditional approaches, including “median justice” and
“opinion writer” models, focus exclusively on the choice
of legal rule, assuming that justices attempt to move the
Court’s opinion as close as possible to their own most
preferred legal rule (e.g., see Epstein and Knight 1998;
Ferejohn and Weingast 1992). Implicitly, this assumes
that justices do not care independently about the disposi-
tion of the case in front of them; that is, they do not care
inherently about whether the party that ought to win un-
der their preferred legal rule actually does. What matters
is that the legal rule adopted by the Court is close to the
justice’s preferred legal rule.7
The fact that justices do not care independently about
the disposition of cases is crucial to these models because
5Note that Spaeth’s U.S. Supreme Court Database uses disposi-
tions (“direction”) as a proxy measure for the legal rule (see http:
//supremecourtdatabase.org/).
6“Case space models” (see Kornhauser 1992; Lax 2007; Lax and
Cameron 2007) explicitly model the connection between rules and
dispositions as cutpoints that divide a case-space into cases that are
“winners” and “losers.”
7In the context of spatial models, the point can be expressed this
way: Consider a justice whose ideal legal rule is L, which awards
victory to Smith over Jones. Given rule A (which awards victory to
Jones) and B (which awards victory to Smith), the justice prefers A
to B whenever A is closer to L (even if B is only marginally further
away from L than A) despite the fact that A implies victory for the
“wrong” party.
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it implies that justices arewilling to “switch sides”between
the (current) majority (which supports one disposition)
to the (current) minority (which supports the other dis-
position). To see why this is significant, consider an ex-
ample. Suppose the Supreme Court is deciding a capital
case involving the question whether a jury is entitled to
hear “victim impact” evidence. The trial judge admitted
such evidence, and the jury imposed the death sentence.
The appellate court affirmed. The “disposition” question
before the SupremeCourt is whether to uphold or reverse
the death sentence. The “legal rule” question is when (i.e.,
to what extent, or under what circumstances) victim im-
pact evidence should be admissible. Suppose there are
four votes on the Court to reverse the death sentence on
the grounds that victim impact evidence should never
be admissible, and four votes to affirm on the ground
that it should always be admissible. The median justice
votes in the Court’s initial conference to reverse the death
sentence because she believes that the particular evidence
presented unfairly tainted the jury. However, when she
sees the draft opinion, she disagrees with the legal rule
articulated in the opinion: in her view, victim impact ev-
idence ought to be admissible sometimes, while the draft
opinion argues that it never should be.
Under existing models, bargaining would now com-
mence for the vote of themedian justice. Those seeking to
allow victim impact evidence would moderate their view,
hoping toattract themedian to their side.Those seeking to
ban such evidence would tone down their preferred rule
in order to prevent the median’s defection. That is, the
threat to “switch sides” provides the median justice with
bargaining power, and the opinion that emerges should
therefore reflect her views. But note that the median’s de-
cision to defect to a more attractive rule could carry with
it the implication that the petitioner before the Court will
be put to death! Putting it differently, because “switching
sides” implies that she would need to vote in favor of a
disposition with which she disagrees (namely, to uphold
the death sentence), the median’s threat to switch sides
is only credible if she does not care (sufficiently) what
happens to the petitioner in the current case.
Suppose—for argument’s sake—that themedian jus-
tice does care which party wins, i.e., that she prefers not to
uphold the death sentence. If this is the case, her bargain-
ing power is undermined because other justices should
recognize that—at least within limits—not giving in to
the median’s demands will not result in her defection to
the minority.
A second feature of judicial decision making rein-
forces this dynamic. A justice who is dissatisfied with the
opinion offered in support of a disposition is free to write
a concurrence, which allows her to support the disposi-
tion, but to do so by offering her own preferred rationale.
That is, a justice is always free to “say what she thinks”
without having to join another coalition of justices. (We
suspect that justices have strong preferences for “saying
what they think,” and refer to this desire as indulgingone’s
“expressive preferences”).8 The availability of this option
further weakens the incentive to “defect”—a justice who
disagrees with an opinion need not join the other side
to express her disagreement. Knowing this, other justices
have less reason to fear a defection, and therefore less
incentive to be accommodating.
Of course, the assumption that justices care indepen-
dently about the disposition of cases, rather than purely
about the legal rules that emerge from them, is critical to
this approach. How plausible is it that justices care about
resolving cases in a manner that awards victory to the
party that they believe ought to win? As a brief scan of
a constitutional law text or the Supreme Court’s docket
suggests, cases often pose salient controversies in which
justices are likely to have preferences over the resolutionof
the particular case. Consider Youngstown Steel.While jus-
tices clearly cared about the legal principles announced in
the decision—which would affect the limits of presiden-
tial power in the future—it is hard to imagine that theydid
not also care about the immediate results of the decision:
namely, whether President Truman would retain posses-
sion of the nation’s steel mills. Similarly, in decisions sur-
rounding the constitutionality of federal statutes, it seems
implausible that justices care only about legal rules, but
disregard the immediate consequences for the dispute.
Can the federal government mandate purchase of health
insurance coverage by individuals?While preferences over
the interpretation of the Commerce Clause, and implica-
tions of this interpretation for congressional power, are
important, it is highly unlikely that the justices do not
consider the implications for health care reform in decid-
ing this issue. Indeed, the famous legal adage “Hard cases
make bad law” points precisely to the fact that because
justices care about the outcome of the dispute in front of
them, legal rules may be (inappropriately) influenced by
the desire to craft a rule that supports a particular out-
come. AsOliverWendell Holmes elaborated in his dissent
in Northern Securities Co. v. United States (1904):
Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For
cases are called great, not by reason of their real
importance in shaping the law of the future, but
8Consider Justice John Paul Stevens’s statement that “[t]here is a
duty to explain your position if it isn’t the same as themajority, and
it’s just part of my thinking about what a judge should do” (quoted
in a New York Times story on Stevens’s impending retirement,
April 9, 2010.)
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because of some accident of immediate over-
whelming interest which appeals to the feelings
and distorts the judgment.9
In short, unlike most traditional approaches (which
focus on the choice of legal rule, disregarding the possibil-
ity that justices have [independent] preferences over the
disposition, and abstract away from the ability to write a
concurrence), the model we develop in the next section
assumes that justices care about rules and dispositions,
that they have expressive preferences, and that they have
the option of writing concurrences if they are dissatisfied
with the proposed majority opinion. As we show, taking
these features into account leads to very different con-
clusions regarding the bargaining dynamics on collegial
courts.
Modeling a Collegial Court
We consider a one-dimensional “case fact” model with a
five-member court.A case is represented as apoint, c ∈ R.
A legal rule is a threshold such that case facts to the left
of the threshold imply judgment in favor of one party,
while case facts to the right result in a judgment for the
other party. For example, the fact space might represent
the intrusiveness of a police search, and a particular case
involves a dispute over the constitutionality of a search of
a given level of intrusiveness. A legal rule indicates how
“intrusive” a search may be before it is deemed uncon-
stitutional. Each justice has a most preferred legal rule,
denoted by the threshold xi ∈ R.
We assume that justices aremotivated by several con-
siderations that enter as additive terms into their utility
functions. First, they care about the legal rule announced
in a majority opinion (if one is issued.) A majority opin-
ion has precedential value, and it is likely to carry par-
ticular weight in shaping “the law” precisely because it
enjoys the support of a majority of the Court’s justices.
We capture this aspect through standard spatial prefer-
ences. Letting p ∈ R denote the legal rule adopted in
a majority opinion, each justice receives a policy payoff
of K − |xi − p|. The parameter K > 0 captures the value
that justices place on establishing a legal rule that perfectly
reflects their rule preferences. Because this term captures
the “policy payoffs” of majority opinions, it only enters
the justices’ utility functions if the opinion attracts a ma-
jority of votes.
9See online Appendix I: The Impact of Dispositions on Judicial
Decision Making for additional supporting material on this point.
Second, justices care about the disposition of a case.
Independent of the legal rule adopted by the Court, a jus-
tice derives some utility from a decision that reaches the
“right” result. The parameter  > 0 captures this aspect
and is added to a justice’s payoff if the party favored by the
justice prevails. Finally, we assume that justices have “ex-
pressive” preferences: they prefer that the opinions they
sign, and with which they are therefore identified, reflect
their sincere preferences. Letting ei denote the legal rule
expressed in an opinion the justice signs and Dxi indicate
whether that opinion reaches the disposition preferred
by the justice, the justice’s expressive benefits are given by
(K − |xi − ei | + Dxi). The parameter  > 0 reflects
the weight that justices place on expressive benefits.
We assume that expressing disagreement with a ma-
jority opinion via a concurrence or dissent is costly.
Writing separately requires time and effort. Moreover,
if justices value consensus (see Corley 2010, 27), there
are costs to taking a public position that disagrees with
the majority. Finally, for justices considering concur-
ring opinions, another consideration is relevant. While a
concurring opinion allows a justice to express her most
preferred rule, it also exposes divisions within the ma-
jority that may undermine the authority of the Court’s
ruling (see Corley 2010, 54). Chief Justice JohnMarshall’s
push for issuing “Opinions of the Court” rather than seri-
atim opinions was driven, at least in part, by this concern
(Carrington 1992; Haskins and Johnson 1981). In our
model, the parameter c > 0 captures costs that a justice
bears for writing separately.
Putting these components together generates an ad-
ditive utility function that represents the justices’ pref-
erences. For example, a justice who agrees with the ma-
jority’s disposition and simply joins the majority opinion
collects the policy and expressive payoffs of that opinion:
Ui (Join) = (1 + )
(
K − |xi − p| + Dxi
)
Or, if the same justice writes a concurrence to ex-
plain any differences between the majority opinion and
her own position, she collects the policy payoff of the
majority opinion (since it is this opinion that has prece-
dential value), but receives the expressive payoff associ-
ated with her concurrence (less the cost of writing sep-
arately), where ei denotes the legal rule expressed in the
concurrence:
Ui (Concurrence) = K − |xi − p| + 
+  (K − |xi − ei | + Dxi
) − c
For the remainder of the article, we assume that ex-
pressive and dispositional preferences are sufficiently im-
portant that justices are not willing to support an opinion
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that results in a disposition with which they disagree.10
This is, of course, a potentially controversial assumption
that characterizes a boundary case and does not hold for
all (or even most) cases decided by the Supreme Court.
We focus on this case because it eases the exposition and
allows us to highlight the logic we identify and to contrast
this model with the underlying dynamic and predictions
of previous models. Having said that, the implications
of the model are not confined to those cases in which
the assumption holds. As long as justices care indepen-
dently about the disposition of cases, they will be willing
to trade victory for the “right” party for some concessions
on the legal rule—and that is enough to undermine the
bargaining power of the median justice and to provide
the coalition median with a measure of influence over
opinions as identified by our model. Indeed, our empir-
ical analysis clearly reveals the influence of the coalition
median, thus providing indirect evidence of the model’s
relevance to a broad class of decisions.
Opinion Location and Concurrence
Behavior
If justices are not willing to “switch sides,” they divide
into a proto-majority and proto-minority according to
their preferences over case disposition. Bargaining over
the majority opinion proceeds only among the justices in
the proto-majority. In analyzing this bargaining process,
we make no assumptions about the bargaining protocol.
Instead, we allow for free-flowing bargaining that en-
ables easy input from the justices of the proto-majority.
This assumption captures the fact that bargaining on the
Supreme Court has little formal structure and proceeds
in an open fashion.11 Because “median justice” models
rest on the assumption of costless bargaining among the
justices, this assumption also ensures that differences be-
tween our model and median justice models are not the
result of introducing bargaining costs.
LetM denote the set of justices in the proto-majority.
For every legal rule p ∈ R, define C (p) as the set of jus-
10Formally, the following constraint is sufficient (but not necessary)
to ensure that a justice in the majority will not “switch sides:”  >=
K+c
1+ . That is, the constraint is derived for a justicewith the strongest
incentive to defect and therefore identifies the largest possible value
of  required to prevent a defection; as we demonstrate in the
appendix, in most circumstances, justices will not defect even if 
is below this threshold. The appendix also provides the condition
that prevents minority justices from switching to the majority side.
11See Maltzman, Spriggs, andWahlbeck (2000) for a detailed treat-
ment of the bargaining process, including the use of threats, sug-
gestions, and wait statements by the justices.
tices who are willing to sign an opinion written at p.
Define the set of potential majority coalitions, PC =
{C (p) : ‖C (p) ≥ 3‖} . In words, PC identifies the pos-
sible majority coalitions, that is, the coalitions that are
able to agree on an opinion that enjoys majority support.
Because all coalitions in PC constitute a majority of the
court, if there are two or more potential coalitions, any
two coalitions must have members in common.
We characterize the bargaining process among the
justices in the proto-majority as follows. Initially, an opin-
ion writer is (exogenously) assigned. The opinion writer
proposes an opinion. Bargaining then proceeds under an
open rule: other justices are able to make costless coun-
terproposals (i.e., suggest changes in the opinion). As-
suming costless bargaining allows us to explore opinion
writer influence that does not rely upon previously de-
rived sources of influence, such as formal agenda-setting
powers (seeHammond, Bonneau, and Sheehan 2005; Lax
and Cameron 2007; Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck
2000). Once a stable opinion emerges (more on that be-
low), each justice in the proto-majority decides what ac-
tion to take. She can join the opinion, write a general con-
currence (join the opinion but also add some additional
comments in a concurrence), write a special concurrence
(do not join the opinion but write separately), or do none
of the above.
To identify the location of opinions, we adopt the
following cooperative solution concept. First, we assume
that justices can only “vote” for an opinion if they are
willing to sign it (i.e., join or join and concur). This re-
striction ensures that justices cannot influence bargain-
ing through noncredible threats. For example, suppose
we have a proto-majority consisting of justices ordered
one through four. Justice 1 is the opinion writer for a
proto-coalition composedof justices 1 through3. Justice 4
is so distant ideologically from this proto-coalition that
he is unwilling to sign any opinion that justices 2 and 3
would sign. In this scenario, justice 4 should be unable to
influence the outcome; since 4will never sign any opinion
that 2 and 3 would sign, justices 2 and 3 cannot use an
alternative coalition with justice 4 as bargaining leverage
over justice 1.
Second, we assume that a majority opinion at p, en-
acted by proto-coalition C (p), is stable if and only if two
conditions are met:
1) There does not exist an alternative majority opin-
ion pˆ that can be enacted by proto-coalitionC ( pˆ)
such that ∀i ∈ C (p) ∩ C ( pˆ) ,Ui ( pˆ) > Ui (p) .
2) There does not exist an alternative majority opin-
ion pˆ that all members of C (p) are willing to
sign and that a majority of C (p) prefers to sign.
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FIGURE 1 Justice i’s Voting and Concurrence Decisions as a
Function of Opinion LocationWhen c ≤ k
To see the logic of the first condition, consider the
supermajority case. Suppose there are four members of
the proto-majority, and justice 1 has written an opinion
that justices 1 through 3 are willing to sign. However,
justices 2 through 4 can agree on an alternative majority
opinion that justices 2 and 3 prefer to the opinion by 1.
Justice 1’s opinion is unstable because some members of
1’s coalition can join another coalition that can write a
majority opinion the defectors prefer.
The second condition adds a within-proto-coalition
majority requirement. If a majority of the members of
the proto-coalition prefer another opinion to the one
offered by the opinion writer, and all members of the
proto-coalition are willing to sign that alternative, then
we consider the proposal made by the opinion writer to
be unstable: opinionwriters who arewilling to support an
opinion preferred by a majority of their coalition cannot
“hold out.”
Opinion Content in Equilibrium
We reserve derivation of the model’s predictions to the
online appendix.12 Here, we focus on characterizing the
implications for the location of the majority opinion and
for concurrence behavior. It is easiest to describe the in-
tuition by considering the decision calculus of an indi-
vidual justice in the proto-majority. Suppose an opin-
ion p has been reached, and the justice must decide
whether to join, concur, or do neither. The trade-offs
are clear: by signing the majority opinion, she can save
the trouble of writing a concurrence. On the other hand,
if she chooses to join and not write a concurrence, she
is publicly identified with the opinion. Not surprisingly,
12Available at http://www.unc.edu/∼gvanberg/Research.html.
justices are willing to join opinions that are relatively
close to their own ideal point and not write a concur-
rence. Once an opinion deviates sufficiently from a jus-
tice’s ideal point, she chooses to concur to give voice to
her preferred legal rule. Figure 1 illustrates the justice’s
behavior.
One important implication is that a majority opin-
ion is only possible if there exists a group of justices
who form a majority and whose preferences are suffi-
ciently homogenous: there must be overlap between the
“join regions” of the justices. For example, suppose the
proto-majority is composed of three justices, all of whose
votes are necessary to create binding precedent. Let the
justices’ ideal thresholds be ordered x1 < x2 < x3. It is
only possible to find a majority opinion if there exists
a rule that both 1 and 3 are willing to sign. This is the
case if x3 − K < x1 + K , i.e., if the distance between the
two justices’ ideal rules is less than 2K . If the proto-
majority contains a supermajority, there may be multiple
“proto-coalitions” that are sufficiently homogenous to
be able to agree on a majority opinion.13 The following
statement summarizes where majority opinions will be
located:
Equilibrium Majority Opinion Location: If a
majority opinion emerges, the rule adopted in
the opinion is either (a) the most preferred rule
of themedianmember of the coalitionwho signs
the opinion, or (b) the rule closest to the rule
most preferred by the median member of the
signing coalition that all members of the signing
coalition are willing to sign.
13As we show in the appendix, all members of a proto-coalition
prefer to join a binding opinion that is located in the “join interval”
of the proto-coalition to not establishing binding precedent. As a
result, if a proto-coalition exists, a majority opinion will emerge.
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FIGURE 2 Example of Opinion Location
Join Interval
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The intuition behind this result is straightforward.
Because justices are unwilling to switch sides on the dis-
position of the case, the median member of the Court
as a whole has lost her central position in the bargain-
ing process. Instead, bargaining among the members of
the proto-majority is concentrated in the group of jus-
tices who will write the majority opinion. It is the me-
dian within this group who now holds central sway—but
this sway is subject to a caveat: the median member of
the proto-coalition will only “get her way” if her most
preferred rule is acceptable to all members of the proto-
coalition. In some circumstances, thismaynot be the case:
a justice whose signature is necessary to unite a majority
behind the opinion may not be willing to join an opinion
at the median’s ideal point. In such a case, the median
must (and, given the homogeneity of the proto-coalition,
is willing to) make sufficient concessions to bring this
justice on board. Nevertheless, this rule will reflect the
preferences of the median of the signing coalition better
than the views of her more extreme colleagues who also
join.
Figure 2 provides an illustration of the case of a
minimal-winning proto-majority. The “join interval”
that identifies the set of opinions all three justices are
willing to sign (and prefer to the failure to establish prece-
dent) is located to the left of the ideal rule preferred by the
median of the signing majority (justice 2). Justices 2 and
3 are able to draw the opinion to the right, but not past
x1 + K because they need (and prefer) to keep justice 1’s
vote. Thus, the opinion is located at the right end of the
join interval, closest to the rule preferred by the signing
coalition median.
If the preferences of justices are so heterogeneous that
no proto-coalition exists, nomajority opinion is possible.
In this case, the plurality opinion will be written at the
ideal point of the opinion writer:
Equilibrium Plurality Opinion Location: If a
plurality opinion emerges from the bargaining
process, the rule adopted in theopinion is located
at the most preferred rule of the opinion writer.
In short, one important substantive implication of
our model is that if justices care both about the rule and
the judgment announced in an opinion, the influence of
the median justice (of the Court) over majority opinions
is typically not as strong as conventional arguments im-
ply. Instead, bargaining power shifts towards the position
of the median member of the signing coalition of the
opinion.
Data andMeasures
In this section, we develop an empirical test of ourmodel.
The model generates implications for the location of
opinions and the concurrence behavior of justices. While
reliable data on concurrences are readily available, es-
timating the location of Supreme Court opinions has
proven challenging (e.g., McGuire and Vanberg 2007).
We therefore focus on testing the model’s implications
for the concurrence behavior.14 In the model, a justice
concurs if and only if the proposed policy is not suffi-
ciently close to her ideal point, i.e., p /∈ [xi − c , xi + c ].
Furthermore, majority opinions are located at (or close
to) the most preferred rule of the median of the signing
coalition, while plurality opinions are located at the opin-
ion writer’s ideal point. As a result, when an opinion is
supported by a majority (plurality), the further a justice
is from the median of the signing coalition (the opinion
writer), the less the content of the opinion reflects her
views.
Hypothesis: For majority opinions, the more
ideologically distant a justice is from the me-
dian of the signing coalition, the more likely that
14In an important recent article, Clark and Lauderdale (2010) de-
velop a method for estimating the position of Supreme Court
opinions using cross-citation patterns. In their illustration of the
method, they test the opinion location prediction of our model
against median justice theory and opinion writer models. Their re-
sults suggest that the preferences of the majority coalition median
are the best predictor of opinion location, a result that is consistent
with our model, and inconsistent with the alternative theories.
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justice is to concur. For plurality opinions, the
more ideologically distant a justice is from the
opinion writer, the more likely that justice is to
concur.
This hypothesis stands in contrast to the implications of
conventional median justice theory, which predicts that
concurrence behavior is a function of distance to the over-
all Courtmedian, and tomodels that predict strong opin-
ion writer influence, which predict that concurrence be-
havior is predicted by distance to the opinion writer in
all cases, not just for plurality opinions.15 An analysis of
concurrence behavior therefore holds out the possibility
of adjudicating between these arguments.
Thedata for our analysis come from theU.S. Supreme
Court Judicial Database (Spaeth 2006) and cover the 1953
through 2005 terms.16 The dependent variable is the deci-
sion by a justice in the majority to file a special or general
concurrence. The key independent variables include a
justice’s ideological distance to the coalition median, the
Court’s median, and the opinion writer, and an indicator
for majority and plurality opinions.
To measure the position of each justice, we rely
on Martin-Quinn scores, which place justices in a one-
dimensional ideological space (Martin and Quinn 2002).
These scores are dynamic, allowing the location of each
justice to evolve over time, and they classify well across
issue areas.17 For the analyses that follow, we only include
cases in which there is perfect spatial voting (with partici-
pation by all members of the Court) based on estimates of
the spatial locations of the justices. We do so to minimize
the possibility that the results might be confounded by
decisions resting on factors other than ideological differ-
ences among the justices.18
15Naturally, other factors may affect the propensity to concur, in-
cluding personal temperament. However, it is not clear that these
idiosyncratic factors are systematically related to a justice’s ideo-
logical position on the Court.
16The unit of analysis is the case citation (ANALU = 0). Decisions
included are formally decided cases issued with written opinions
after full oral argument and cases decided by an equally divided
vote (DEC TYPE= 1, 5, 6, 7). The findings are robust if the docket,
rather than the case citation, is the unit of analysis (see online
Appendix Table 10).
17Using M-Q scores to predict votes on the merits raises issues
of endogeneity because votes are used to create the scores. This
problem does not arise here because decisions to concur are not
used in the construction of the measure.
18Perfect spatial voting occurs when the majority and minority
coalitions are connected. We focus on these cases because we are
more comfortable using cases that resolve in a manner consistent
with the underlying measurement model. Our substantive results
are robust to including cases without perfect spatial voting (see
Results
As a first cut, Table 1 summarizes the number of special
concurrences for each coalition type in the dataset; e.g.,
all 5–4, 6–3, 7–2, 8–1, and unanimous coalitions. For
example, in the 2005 term, a “6–3 Right” coalition is a
coalition in which Justices Breyer through Scalia are in
the majority. A “6–3 Left” coalition refers to a majority
comprised of Justice Stevens throughKennedy, and so on.
Consistent with our theory’s prediction, the median
of the majority coalition (where that median differs from
the median of the Court) concurs less often than the
median of the Court. Further, concurrences generally in-
crease as one moves away from the median of the coali-
tion. The patterns in the “Right” coalitions are especially
striking. These results are broadly consistent with our
hypothesized relationship and inconsistent with median
justice theory.
To evaluate the alternative theories more systemati-
cally, we compare a series of nonnested models.19 Let Yi
indicate whether the justice voted to concur in a case or
not, xi denote the justice’s ideal point, xO,i denote the
location of the opinion coalition median, and xW,i de-
note the location of the opinion writer. Further, let pi be
a binary indicator of whether the opinion is a plurality
opinion or not. The model we estimate to test our main
hypothesis is thus:
Pr(Yi = 1 | •) = (0 + 1[I (pi = 1) | xi − xW,i |
+ I (pi = 0)|xi − xO,i |])
denotes the cumulative distribution functionof the
logistic distribution, and I is an indicator function. 20 We
compare our coalitionmedianmodel with a model moti-
vated by median justice theory (MJT) and an opinion-
writer model, estimated using maximum likelihood.21
Estimates for these models with special concurrences and
online Appendix Table 8). Most cases in the database fall out along
ideological lines.
19The units of analysis are decisions of justices in the majority who
are not the opinion writer to file a concurrence. This leaves us with
17, 422 justice decisions.
20This specification assumes a single parameter characterizes the
effects of distance to the opinion writer or distance to the coalition
median. In Table 1 of the online appendix, we fit the model sepa-
rately and show that this assumption is not driving the findings.We
stick with a single parameter model because using it biases against
finding superiority over the MJT or other models. We also com-
pare our results to a fully saturated model including distance to the
median justice, distance to the opinion writer, and distance to the
coalition model. Our model outperforms this model (see Table 9,
online appendix), which is an extremely strong result.
21We report asymptotic standard errors rather than “robust” ones
since their use is questionable in all but linear models. The
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TABLE 1 Number of Special Concurrences for Cases with Perfect Spatial Voting for the 1953–2005
Terms. Number of Cases Shows the Total Number of Cases with the Particular Coalition
Structure
5–4 Right 6–3 Right 7–2 Right 8–1 Right
Unan-
imous 8–1 Left 7–2 Left 6–3 Left 5–4 Left
Justice 1 171 11 4 1 1
Justice 2 14 142 5 5 3 3
Justice 3 32 14 114 7 4 5 3
Justice 4 21 21 11 118 8 6 2 3
Justice 5 16 8 15 8 75 6 10 14 7
Justice 6 18 7 8 6 86 8 11 12
Justice 7 10 5 4 6 75 15 10
Justice 8 18 14 10 10 147 18
Justice 9 11 6 9 13 158
Number of Cases 367 253 201 185 1741 110 110 111 192
both special and general concurrences are presented in
Table 2.22 In all models, we find a statistically signifi-
cant relationship between the distance measures and the
propensity to concur, signed in the hypothesized direc-
tion. A number of reasons explain why, our arguments
about the failings of median justice theory notwithstand-
ing, the relationship between distance to the median jus-
tice and propensity to concur is statistically significant.
First, the correlation between distance from the coali-
tion median and distance from the Court median is high
(r= 0.92). Second,while our argumenthas focusedon the
boundary case in which justices are unwilling to switch
sides, justicesmay bewilling to trade disposition for opin-
ion language in some cases. Finally, given the number of
observations, nearly any relationship will be statistically
significant. As a result, the critical test of our theory lies
in a comparison of models.
Which model is best? One way to compare mod-
els is in-sample prediction. However, this is not princi-
pled and encourages overfitting. The substantive value
substantive findings do not differ with robust standard errors.
To test the robustness of the findings, we refit the models using
a random effects logistic regression, clustering by justice and case
(online Appendix Table 3). The estimated signs and levels of sig-
nificance are stable across these specifications. We also reestimated
the models excluding unanimous cases, excluding 5–4 cases, ex-
cluding both, and including nonperfect spatial voting cases (online
Appendix Tables 5–8). The substantive conclusions do not differ.
22In a special concurrence, a justice agrees with the disposition but
not the rationale given by theCourt. In a general concurrence, a jus-
tice agrees in part with the rationale. Because general concurrences
may reflect minor differences or profound disagreement, they do
not “mean the same thing” across cases. As a result, we believe that
focusing on special concurrences provides a clearer picture.
of our test lies in using statistical models to distinguish
between competing explanations. Since the models are
not nested, we use the Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC), an approximate Bayes factor, to compare themod-
els (Raftery 1995). The model with the lower BIC is su-
perior. As can be seen in Table 2, our model outperforms
both the median justice model and the opinion writer
model.23
The estimated effects are substantively significant.
In Figure 3 we plot the predicted probability of special
concurrence (based on the column 1 estimates) for ma-
jority opinions. The figure shows that the probability of
a special concurrence is 4.7% when the justice is located
at the median of the opinion coalition. The predicted
probability increases over fivefold to 25.4% when the
justice is six units away on the Martin-Quinn scale. (The
distance between Stevens and Thomas during the 2005
term of the Court is nearly seven points.) These prob-
ability differentials are large; when a justice is close to
the coalition median, she is predicted to concur only
1 in 20 times, but when she is far, this rises to 1 in
4 times.
In short, the patterns of concurrences on the U.S.
Supreme Court are better explained by the distance be-
tween a justice and the median member of the signing
coalition than by the distance between the justice and
23One weakness of the BIC is that it is a heuristic and observed
differences in BIC do not correspond to probabilities. In online
Appendix Table 2 we report the Bayes factors between these four
possible models on a base-10 logarithmic scale. The Bayes factor
between our model and the others are all large, which suggests that
the posterior probability that ourmodel is better than all the others
exceeds 99.9%.
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TABLE 2 Logistic Regression Estimates for the Alternative, Median Justice Theory (MJT), and
OpinionWriter Concurrence Models
Coalition
Median MJT Opinion
Coalition Model Model Writer
Median MJT Opinion (Including (Including (Including
Covariates Model Model Writer General) General) General)
Constant −3.018 −2.701 −2.985 −2.169 −1.994 −2.191
(0.044) (0.042) (0.050) (0.033) (0.032) (0.038)
Distance to Coalition 0.324 0.229
Median (Majority Case)
or Opinion Writer
(Plurality Case)
(0.017) (0.014)
Distance to Court Median 0.145 0.118
(0.018) (0.015)
Distance to Opinion Writer 0.200 0.154
(0.014) (0.011)
N 17422 17422 17422 17422 17422 17422
Log-Likelihood −4597.84 −4733.08 −4670.80 −6940.23 −7031.89 −6977.29
BIC 9273.79 9544.28 9419.73 13958.58 14141.90 14033.29
Note: The second set of models contains both special and general concurrences. The estimates are maximum likelihood, with asymptotic
standard errors in parentheses.
the median justice or the opinion writer. Coupled with
Clark and Lauderdale’s (2010) findings on opinion lo-
cation, these results provide substantial support for our
FIGURE 3 Predicted Probabilities of a Special
Concurrence as a Function ofDistance
to the Opinion CoalitionMedian
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Note: The probabilities are based on model estimates in Table 2,
column 1. The vertical lines denote 95% confidence intervals for
the prediction.
argument.24 The data reflect the model’s predictions for
opinion location and concurrence behavior.
Conclusion
Predominant academic and popular views hold that
majority opinions of the Supreme Court reflect either
the preferences of the Court’s median justice or of the
opinion’s author. The argument we have presented chal-
lenges both accounts and highlights the influence of the
medianmember of the signing coalition in shaping opinion
content. This result derives from taking account of two
facets of judicial decision making that have received little
attention in previous models. One is that in crafting legal
rules, justices must resolve particular cases, and therefore
may have preferences over which party prevails in the dis-
pute before them. The second is the fact that justices who
disagree with the rationale offered in an opinion are free
24In an online appendix, we analyze a saturated model that is iden-
tical to Clark and Lauderdale’s estimation and find the same results,
including a negative sign on distance to the median justice (see on-
line Appendix Table 9).We also perform supplemental analysis that
finds support for the influence of the opinion writer in addition to
the median of the coalition for majority decisions. These findings
are consistent with the findings of the saturated model and suggest
support for the agenda-setting opinion writer model in addition to
our model.
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to write concurrences. Both features imply that justices
who agree with the majority on case disposition but are
uncomfortable with the rationale offered in the Court’s
opinion may not want to—and need not—“switch sides”
to theminority. This undermines the credibility of a threat
to defect and therefore reduces the median justice’s bar-
gaining power. Empirical analysis of the ideological po-
sition of Supreme Court opinions (Clark and Lauderdale
2010) is consistent with this claim, as is our empirical
investigation of concurrence behavior.
The conclusion that the median of the signing coali-
tion is particularly influential in shaping the content of
majority opinions has significant implications. For one,
it implies that the opinions issued by the Court are
less “centrist” (with respect to the Court) than gener-
ally believed—opinionswill be systematically drawn away
from the Court’s center to its wings. To illustrate the po-
tential significance of these effects, consider the following
illustration. For the data included in our empirical test
(the 1953–2005) terms, the median justice in the major-
ity coalition differs from the median justice of the Court
in 65.3% of the cases. The average distance between the
medianmember of themajority coalition and themedian
justice in these cases is 0.66 on the Martin-Quinn scale.
Across terms, this average distance varies from a mini-
mum of .25 to a maximum of 1.13. To put these numbers
into context, the difference in Martin-Quinn scores be-
tween justices Kennedy and Rehnquist during the 2003
term was .60, and the difference between Kennedy and
Roberts during the 2005 term was .98. In other words,
who shapes the content of the opinions is likely to have
significant impact on decisions.
This, in turn, implies that there may be less consis-
tency between opinions than we would expect if a single
justice is in the proverbial “driver’s seat”: because the
median of the signing coalition can change from deci-
sion to decision, we may observe quite different opin-
ions within the same policy area even within the same
natural Court. Moreover, the argument has implications
for relations within the judicial hierarchy. To the extent
that the rules announced by the Court are pulled away
from the Court’s median justice, lower courts may find
themselves in an awkward position: faithful application
of the legal rule (which is not located at the position of
the median) will result in a disposition that the median
justice does not favor—and therefore result in a reversal
if the lower court’s decision is reviewed. On the other
hand, deciding the case at hand in a manner that se-
cures the disposition favored by the median justice of
the Supreme Court requires the lower court to announce
a legal rule that is inconsistent with the Court’s prior
decision.
Finally, if correct, our analysis implies that appoint-
ments to the Supreme Court, even if they do not change
the Court’s median, are more significant than is often
believed. Consider the reaction to the recent announce-
ment of Justice David Souter’s retirement. In its front-
page article on the retirement, theNew York Times argued
that “[r]eplacing Justice Souter with a liberal would not
change the basicmakeup of the Court, where he and three
other justices hold down the left wing against a conser-
vative caucus of four justices. Justice Anthony Kennedy, a
moderate Republican appointee, often provides the swing
vote that controls important decisions” (May 2, p. 1).
Our argument—and evidence—suggest that the reality
of appointments is more complex. To the extent that ap-
pointments shift the ideological composition of majority
coalitions, and the location of coalitionmedians, they can
have dramatic consequences for the content of opinions.
Naturally, our argument is but a first step in un-
derstanding how collegial court bargaining shapes judi-
cial policy. Two issues deserve mention. First, our formal
analysis relies on the (strong) assumption that justices
care sufficiently about the disposition that they are un-
willing to “switch sides.” While this is plausible in some
cases, in others it may not be so. Importantly, the dy-
namics we identify are not only relevant to those cases in
which the assumption is met. Even if justices are will-
ing to support dispositions with which they disagree,
as long as they care independently about the disposi-
tion, the bargaining power of the median justice wanes,
and the influence of the coalition median increases. This
is the case because such preferences introduce an asym-
metry into justices’ preferences over rules. Although they
may be willing to support a disposition with which they
disagree, they would prefer to remain on the “right side,”
even if they must accept a rule that does not reflect their
opinions perfectly. This reluctance opens a wedge be-
tween the location of majority opinions and the views of
the median justice. The more the disposition matters, the
more significant this wedge. In other words, our model
and median-justice models mark the two end-points of
a continuum. Where opinions fall along this contin-
uum depends on the weight placed by justices on the
disposition. The fact that our empirical analysis as well as
Clark and Lauderdale’s (2007) work clearly demonstrate
the influence of the coalition median empirically—an in-
fluence that is not predicted by existingmodels of judicial
behavior—strongly suggests the relevance of the model
for a broad class of Supreme Court decisions.
The second issue is more vexing. Majority opin-
ions are accorded special status in academic analysis and
the popular press. They are presumed to create binding
precedent. Understanding how bargaining on a collegial
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court affects what goes into such opinions, andwhich jus-
tices are particularly influential, is therefore of interest. At
the same time, the content ofmajority opinions cannot be
equated with the “the law” that is created through judicial
adjudication. To the extent that “the law” is a function
of expectations that lower court judges, policy makers,
and potential litigants hold about future decisions, the
content of majority opinions is only one ingredient. Con-
currences, dissents, judicial appointments, and a host of
other factors may shape these expectations as well. While
understanding the content of majority opinions is an im-
portant step in the challenging endeavor of determining
where “the law” rests, it is only a first one.
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